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  1I MOTIVATION 
This paper studies the strength of other-regarding preferences using non-experimental data. 
Specifically, I use longitudinal data on German couples to study the effects of plausibly 
exogenous changes in the respective partner’s health on individual life satisfaction and 
compare these with the effects of changes in individual health. Evidence from life satisfaction 
regressions suggests that women and to a lesser extent men are harmed by spousal disability 
which is consistent with the existence of other-regarding preferences within couples. The 
magnitude of effects suggests that spousal disability is about one fifth to one half as harmful 
as individual disability with larger effects being found for women. 
In a broad sense, other-regarding or social preferences refer to situations where individual 
utility does not only depend on commodities and goods that are at the individual’s disposal, 
but also on goods or the well-being of some reference group.
1 Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) 
provide evidence on the economic consequences of such preferences, while Fehr and Schmidt 
(2003) and Sobel (2005) summarize various ways to model such preferences and the (mostly 
experimental) evidence in favor of them. 
The purpose of this paper is relatively straightforward: I study the strength of social 
preferences using information on subjective well-being and changes in the disability status of 
the respective partner within German couples using data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1984 to 2006. The main idea here is rather simple: If an 
individual’s subjective well-being drops after his or her partner becomes disabled and if we 
are able to rule out confounding explanations for this drop, e.g. the probably unavoidable loss 
of household income caused by the disability of a household member, then this drop can be 
interpreted as the loss of utility caused by the harm of the respective partner. Additionally, I 
                                                 
1 Additionally, individual utility may depend on one’s relative positions in a group, see e.g. Clark et al. (2009) 
for recent evidence. 
  2provide comparisons with the loss in well-being that is caused by individual disability to help 
in gauging the strength of these effects. 
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to use subjective measures of well-being 
and variation of a partner’s health status to study the strength of social preferences. On a 
practical level, the results may also be useful as a quantification of individual suffering when 
calculating e.g. compensating payments after accidents that led to disability. 
Using the setup described above has a number of advantages in the context of this analysis. 
First, while it is notoriously difficult to identify an individual’s reference group in many 
settings, it seems very likely that individuals care for the well-being of their respective partner 
within couples. In fact, Winkelmann (2005) and Bruhin and Winkelmann (2008) provide 
direct evidence that measures of subjective well-being within families are correlated and that 
social preferences exist within families. Secondly, the fact that disability leads to (at least 
partially permanent) losses in well-being has been well documented in the literature (see e.g. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag [2002], Lucas [2007], Oswald and Powdthavee [2007] and 
Ville et al [2001]).
2 Thirdly, changes in a partner’s disability status can be plausibly assumed 
to be exogenous in individual life-satisfaction regressions (see Oswald and Powdthavee 
[2007], Wu [2001] relies on a similar argument when using heart conditions) - at least to a 
greater extent than other possible adverse events, e.g. unemployment, that could affect the 
partner’s well-being. Finally, the data allows me to use changes in a partner’s health status 
within couples while controlling for possible confounders, like the likely income loss 
following disability, as well as for individual unobserved heterogeneity.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and 
descriptive evidence. The identification strategy is outlined in section 3, results follow in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
2 Similar evidence exists for other types of (permanent) disease, see.e.g. Groot et al. (2004) and Wu (2001). 
 
  3II DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
The data come from the 1984 to 2006 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, 
see Wagner, Frick, Schupp [2007] for a general overview), a representative longitudinal 
household survey of the German population provided by the DIW Berlin. Further information 
on the sampling design as well as additional information on the overall structure of the SOEP 
can be found in Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005). 
I use two measures of disability, both tied to the definition of a disabled person in German 
social security legislation. The first is an indicator whether an individual is considered to be 
severely disabled by German law. This is the case when the degree of disability, as 
determined by an official medical examination exceeds 50, which equals e.g. the loss of a 
lower arm or the loss of a hand. Individuals with a degree of disability between 30 and 50 
may obtain disability status when they would otherwise be unable to find a job (see §2 SGB 
IX, book 9 of the German social security code). The second measure is the degree of 
disability which runs from 0 to 100 (in steps of 5 or 10). The conditions that have to be 
fulfilled for a certain degree are legally fixed and are laid down in the Anhaltspunkte für die 
ärztliche Gutachtertätigkeit (see e.g. Schillings and Wendler [2006]). About 85% of all 
disabilities are caused by disease, while roughly 5% are congenital, related to accidents or to 
war wounds respectively (see Statistisches Bundesamt [2003]). Note that changes in the 
disability measures observed in the sample are most likely caused by disability or accidents as 
congenital disabilities are fixed at birth and those related to war wounds are almost 
exclusively the results of World War II and are consequently fixed before the observation 
period.  
The measure of subjective well-being is the answer to the direct question “How satisfied are 
you with your life, all things considered? Please answer according to the following scale: 0 
  4means completely dissatisfied, 10 means completely satisfied.” that is usually applied in the 
subjective well-being literature.  
I restrict the sample to individuals between 18 and 75 years and keep only those observations 
where a partner is present and has non-missing information on his or her disability status. I 
also drop observations where the variation in the partner’s disability status arises through 
changes of the respective partner. These cases could bias the estimates if e.g. a change in 
partner raises happiness and individuals are more likely to change partners after he or she 
becomes disabled. However, results are almost identical when keeping these observations. 
After dropping observations with missing information on any control variable, I end up with 
52,072 person-year-observations from 8,778 men and with 50,951 person-year-observations 
from 8,725 women. Descriptive statistics for both samples can be found in table 1. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
 
Figures 1 and 2 plot the distribution of the well-being measures for men and women without a 
disability, for disabled individuals and for individuals with a disabled partner. Both men and 
women report lower levels of happiness when either they or their partner become disabled. 
This difference in happiness is larger for individual disability and seems also larger for 
women than for men. Apart from that both figures show the relatively common result that 
individuals are on average quite happy with their lives as the mode values of 7 and 8 in each 
panel indicate. 
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
Figure 3 plots the difference in average happiness before and after the onset of disability for 
individuals who became disabled (left panels) and for individuals whose partner became 
disabled (right panels). For most cases, we observe a decline in average happiness after the 
onset of disability. This decline seems somewhat stronger for individuals who became 
  5themselves disabled but can also be observed for individuals who faced the disability of their 
partner. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
III ESTIMATION 
I consider the estimating equation 
yit = αi + θt + β’Xit + τ*Dit + εit,         ( 1 )  
where  αi and θt are individual and year fixed-effects, Xit contains time-varying control 
variables, εit is a standard error term and Dit is the respective measure of disability. Depending 
on the model Dit contains either a dummy variable indicating (legal) disability status (Model 
I), the degree of disability in a linear specification (Model II) or dummies for various degrees 
of disability to allow for non-linear effects (Model III). The included control variables are a 
set of dummies for household composition (which includes information on children), 
dummies for labor force status and nationality, age and age squared, years of education and 
work and unemployment experience. To control for changes in income that seem likely after a 
household member becomes disabled, I also include monthly net household income. The 
effect of disability on happiness, τ, is identified using (joint) changes in (own and partner’s) 
disability status and subjective well-being within individuals. All standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering on the individual level. 
To apply the usual within-estimator, I treat the measure of subjective well-being as metric. I 
also experimented with the simpler version of the Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) 
estimator used by Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew (2009). Here, the measure of well-
being is collapsed into a binary variable indicating above-average happiness using individual 
specific thresholds and Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logit estimator is used for 
estimation. Unfortunately, this model did not converge when adding time dummies. However, 
as the results in models without time dummies where generally identical between the 
  6conditional logit and the within-estimator, the choice of the estimator seems relatively 
innocuous. This result is similar to the findings by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers (2004) who 
also reported a relatively minor impact of the choice between cardinal and ordinal subjective 
well-being. 
Another issue is the question whether disability is indeed exogenous in life-satisfaction 
regressions or whether there are unobserved confounders that are correlated with both 
subjective well-being and disability. Remember from section 2 that changes in disability 
status during the observation period are the results of disease or to a much lesser extent 
accidents, while disabilities from war wounds and congenital disabilities are likely fixed at the 
beginning of the observation period. Note further that we can essentially rule out biological 
confounders that make individuals more vulnerable to disease and intrinsically less happy as 
these should be captured by the fixed effects. This holds to an even stronger degree when 
talking about the respective partner’s disability. The essential assumption needed to give τ a 
causal interpretation is that changes in disability status are uncorrelated with unexplained 
changes in well-being which seems plausible. 
IV RESULTS 
Consider the estimation results for men in table 2 and for women in table 3. Both tables show 
similar responses to the onset of individual disability. Using the simple disability dummy in 
Model I, I find drops in happiness in the magnitude of -0.27 to -0.28. This drop roughly 
equals the happiness loss associated with a decline in monthly household income by 2,700 to 
2,800 € which is more than the mean income in the sample. Using a linear specification for 
the degree of disability the drop in happiness by a 1 point increase is estimated to be -0.0063 
or -0.0072 which equals income losses by 63 or 72€. For Model III, the results show penalties 
that are rising with the degree of disability and that become particularly large for degrees of 
disability above 80. The loss of happiness caused by going from a degree of disability of 0 to 
  790 to 100 lies between -0.88 and -0.96 which is roughly equal to a loss in household income 
by 8,800 to 9,600 €.  
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE.] 
Now compare these with the results for the respective partner’s disability. Intuitively we 
would expect that the effects of the partner’s disability on individual well-being lie 
somewhere between zero and the effects of individual disability. Positive effects would 
indicate that individuals actually enjoy adverse shocks to their partner’s health, while effects 
greater than the effects for individual disability would suggest that individuals are harmed 
more by their partner’s suffering than by their own which seems both unlikely.  
A look at the results reveals marked differences between men and women. Men generally 
seem to be unaffected by all but the most extreme forms of their partner’s disability. Point 
estimates for the disability dummy as well as for a linear increase in the degree of disability 
are generally small and consequently insignificant. Similarly, the point estimates for the 
degree of disability dummies are often small and with the exception of the highest degree of 
disability always insignificant. For the latter, we see a drop in happiness that is roughly equal 
to one quarter of the effect for the corresponding degree of own disability. The relation of 
these last-mentioned effects generally fits the results by Winkelmann (2005) who estimated 
the correlation of well-being between spouses to be 0.2.  
The results for women stand in stark contrast to those for men as large and significantly 
negative effects are found in all models. Specifically, I find a drop in subjective well-being of 
-0.14 using the simple disability dummy while the effect in the linear specification using the 
degree of disability is found to be -0.0032. The latter results seem to be driven by the huge 
losses in well-being associated with the higher levels of the partner’s disability as can be seen 
from the dummy specification in Model III. The effects of the partner’s disability lie roughly 
between one third and one half of the effects of individual disability.  
  8Taken together, the results suggest that the well-being of women and to some extent men is 
harmed by the suffering of their partner which is consistent with the existence of other-
regarding preferences within couples. The magnitude of the (significant) results is broadly in 
line with previous evidence by Winkelmann (2005) and suggests that the loss of well-being 
caused by a permanent adverse health shock to an individual’s partner is between one quarter 
and one half of the corresponding loss by the same health shock to the respective individual. 
Additionally, the results imply that men and women react very differently to adverse health 
shocks that hit their respective partners despite similar reactions to adverse shocks to their 
own health.  
While these results suggest gender-specific differences in the strength of other-regarding 
preferences, they could simply be the results of the decline in economic opportunities the 
household faces as one of its members suffers an adverse health shock. The latter effect could 
in principle be stronger for women if they are economically more dependent on their partner 
than men and hence lose relatively more by his disability and possible inability to work. 
However, there are two reasons that make this explanation unlikely. First, all estimates 
control for net household income and labor force status which should capture the largest part 
of a possible economic decline. Secondly, if the drop in subjective well-being due to the 
partner’s disability is caused by a decline in economic opportunities and if this decline differs 
between men and women, the drop in well-being caused by individual disability should also 
differ between men and women which is clearly not the case.  
V CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrated that individuals suffer losses in subjective well-being when their 
respective partner is hit by a permanent adverse health shock, specifically disability. This 
finding is consistent with the existence of other-regarding preferences within couples. Using 
longitudinal panel data on German couples from the Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1984 
  9to 2006, I compared the losses in subjective well-being caused by the onset of own disability 
with the losses caused by the disability of the respective partner while controlling for 
economic conditions and unobserved heterogeneity. The results indicate that women and to a 
lesser extent men suffer losses in subjective well-being from the disability of their partner. 
The magnitude of results suggests that the disability of a partner is about one quarter to one 
half as harmful as individual disability. This finding is broadly in line with previous findings 
by Winkelmann (2005) who estimated the correlations of subjective well-being among 
spouses to be 0.2. Furthermore, the results of this paper suggest that women are harmed much 
more by their partner’s disability, while showing similar reactions to individual disability.  
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Figure 1 
Distribution of subjective well-being measure by disability, men 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006 Figure 2 
Distribution of subjective well-being measure by disability, women 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006 
 
  14 Figure 3 
Changes in average subjective well-being before and after own or partner’s disability 
 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel, pooled over years 1984 to 2006, only observations with a change in individual disability (panels a and c) or 
partner’s disability (panels b and d) 
  15 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Men  Women 
  Mean  Std. Dev  Std. Dev 
(within) 
Mean  Std. Dev  Std. Dev 
(within) 
Subjective well-being (0 to 10)  6.90  1.76  1.15  6.91  1.76  1.16 
Own disability         
Disabled (1 = yes)  .138  .345  .151  .095  .293  .128 
Degree of disability (index from 0 to 100)  7.01  19.67  8.35  5.05  17.39  7.36 
Degree of disability 0 (1 = yes)  .866 .341 .148 .909 .288  .126 
Degree of disability 1 to 30 (1 = yes)  .013  .114  .067  .006  .074  .045 
 Degree of disability 30 to 49 (1 = yes)eg3  .038  .192  .104  .023  .149  .082 
Degree of disability 50 to 59 (1 = yes)g4 .032  .1767  .096  .025  .157  .087 
Degree of disability 60 to 69 (1 =  yes)  .018 .133 .074 .013 .114  .064 
Degree of disability 70 to 79 (1 =  yes)  .009 .095 .056 .005 .071  .043 
Degree of disability 80 to 89 (1 =  yes)  .009 .093 .055 .007 .083  .048 
Degree of disability 90 to  100 (1 = yes)  .014  .119  .065  .012  .110  .057 
Partner’s disability         
Disabled (1 = yes)  .092  .289  .130  .142  .349  .149 
Degree of disability (index from 0 to 100)  4.92  17.18  7.40  7.27  20.08  8.36 
Degree of disability 0 (1 = yes)  .912 .284 .128 .862 .345  .147 
Degree of disability 1 to 30 (1 = yes)  .005  .073  .045  .013  .115  .067 
 Degree of disability 30 to 49 (1 = yes)eg3  .022  .147  .083  .039  .194  .103 
Degree of disability 50 to 59 (1 =  yes)g4  .024 .154 .087 .033 .178  .097 
Degree of disability 60 to 69 (1 =  yes)  .013 .112 .063 .018 .133  .073 
Degree of disability 70 to 79 (1 =  yes)  .005 .073 .043 .010 .099  .056 
  16 Degree of disability 80 to 89 (1 =  yes)  .007 .083 .050 .009 .095  .0555 
Degree of disability 90 to  100 (1 = yes)  .012  .108  .057  .016  .124  .067 
Control variables         
Age (years)  47.98  13.10  3.24  45.52  13.24  3.20 
Years of schooling  11.82  2.81  .46  11.43  2.61  .424 
Work experience (years)  24.11  11.99  2.61  13.35  11.53  1.71 
Unemployment experience (years)  .69  1.66  .64  .77  1.72  .63 
Monthly household net income (€)  2487.81  1610.43  775.29  2489.54  1622.24  765.36 
Couple without children (1 = yes)  .376  .484  .201  .384  .486  .207 
Single parent (1 = yes)  .001  .028  .017  .001  .026  .017 
Couple with children younger than 16 (1 = yes)  .318  .466  .254  .313  .464  .251 
Couple with children older than 16 (1 = yes)  .167  .373  .245  .166  .372  .244 
Couple with children younger and older than 16 
(1 = yes) 
.010 .299 .216 .098 .297  .214 
Multiple generation household (1 = yes)  .027  .163  .093  .027  .163  .093 
Other combination (1 = yes)  .011  .104  .063  .011  .103  .059 
German nationality (1 = yes)  .752  .432  .073  .774  .418  .072 
Married (1 = yes)  .900  .300  .114  .898  .303  .118 
Out of the labor force (1 = yes)  .076  .265  .193  .218  .413  .252 
Retired (1 = yes)  .113  .317  .168  .093  .290  .148 
Unemployed (1 = yes)  .075  .263  .204  .074  .262  .202 
Other labor force status (1 = yes)  .143  .350  .200  .170.  375  .249 
No. of. Obs.  52,072        50,951   
No. of Individuals  8,778        8,725   
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Table 2 
Own and partner’s disability and reported subjective well-being, male sample, FE-estimates 
  Model I: Disability dummy  Model II: Degree of disability, linear 
specification 
Model III: Degree of disability, 
dummy specification 
  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab. 
Disabled  (1  =  yes)  -0.2774***  0.0319      
  (0.0604)  (0.0614)      
Degree of disability (index from 0 to 100)      -0.0072***  -0.0005     
     (0.0012)  (0.0011)    
Degree of disability <30 (1 = yes)          0.0167  -0.0152 
       (0.0974)  (0.1384) 
Degree of disability 30 to 49 (1 = yes)          -0.1992*  0.0353 
       (0.0836)  (0.1005) 
Degree of disability 50 to 59 (1 = yes)          -0.2649**  0.0235 
       (0.0909)  (0.0800) 
Degree of disability 60 to 69 (1 = yes)          -0.2656*  0.1214 
       (0.1176)  (0.1333) 
Degree of disability 70 to 79 (1 = yes)          -0.4062**  -0.0413 
       (0.1546)  (0.1619) 
Degree of disability 80 to 89 (1 = yes)          -0.4310**  0.2021 
       (0.1643)  (0.1342) 
Degree of disability 90 to  100 (1 = yes)          -0.9614***  -0.2703* 
       (0.1676)  (0.1369) 
Age (years)  -0.1039***  -0.1061***  -0.0992*** -0.1069*** -0.0978*** -0.1081*** 
 (0.0239)  (0.0237)  (0.0239)  (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0237) 
Age  (squared)  0.0005** 0.0004** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Years of schooling  -0.0397*  -0.0395*  -0.0380* -0.0395* -0.0376* -0.0396* 
 (0.0175)  (0.0176)  (0.0173)  (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0176) 
Work  experience  (years)  0.0126 0.0153 0.0085 0.0154 0.0074 0.0162 
 (0.0121)  (0.0119)  (0.0121)  (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Unemployment  experience  (years)  0.0324+ 0.0318  0.0279 0.0323+ 0.0258 0.0337+ 
 (0.0196)  (0.0195)  (0.0193)  (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0193)  
Monthly  household  net  income  (€)  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
German nationality (1 = yes)  -0.0935  -0.0967 -0.0951 -0.0969 -0.0983 -0.0976 
 (0.1055)  (0.1065)  (0.1055)  (0.1064) (0.1060) (0.1065) 
Married  (1  =  yes)  -0.0098 -0.0090 -0.0096 -0.0078 -0.0079 -0.0074 
 (0.0561)  (0.0564)  (0.0560)  (0.0564) (0.0560) (0.0564) 
Out of the labor force (1 = yes)  -0.3524***  -0.3892*** -0.3283*** -0.3882*** -0.3334*** -0.3869*** 
 (0.0483)  (0.0485)  (0.0479)  (0.0485) (0.0478) (0.0484) 
Retired  (1  =  yes)  0.0910 0.0880 0.0940 0.0884 0.0950 0.0923 
 (0.0590)  (0.0589)  (0.0588)  (0.0589) (0.0586) (0.0589) 
Unemployed (1 = yes)  -0.8055***  -0.8197*** -0.8027*** -0.8192*** -0.8056*** -0.8184*** 
 (0.0436)  (0.0436)  (0.0434)  (0.0435) (0.0435) (0.0436) 
Other labor force status (1 = yes)  -0.3718***  -0.3843*** -0.3651*** -0.3839*** -0.3676*** -0.3833*** 
 (0.0486)  (0.0486)  (0.0484)  (0.0486) (0.0484) (0.0486) 
Constant  10.8722*** 10.9619*** 10.7422*** 10.9673*** 10.7143*** 11.0052*** 
 (0.6596)  (0.6585)  (0.6589)  (0.6588) (0.6566) (0.6570) 
7 Household type dummies  (included)  (included)  (included) (included) (included) (included) 
Year  dummies  (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) 
No. of observations  52,072  52,072 52,072 52,072 52,072 52,072 
No.  of  individuals  8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 8,778 
Sig.(Model)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
  19 Table 3 
Own and partner’s disability and reported subjective well-being, female sample 
 
  Model I: Disability dummy  Model II: Degree of disability, linear 
specification 
Model III: Degree of disability, 
dummy specification 
  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab.  Own disab.  Partner’s disab. 
Disabled (1 = yes)  -0.2655***  -0.1413*         
  (0.0699)  (0.0556)      
Degree of disability (index from 0 to 100)      -0.0063***  -0.0032**     
     (0.0014)  (0.0010)    
Degree of disability <30 (1 = yes)          -0.1085  -0.1189 
       (0.1566)  (0.1000) 
Degree of disability 30 to 49 (1 = yes)          -0.1287  -0.1963* 
       (0.1035)  (0.0827) 
Degree of disability 50 to 59 (1 = yes)          -0.2518**  -0.0277 
       (0.0968)  (0.0854) 
Degree of disability 60 to 69 (1 = yes)          -0.2344+  -0.1480 
       (0.1355)  (0.1164) 
Degree of disability 70 to 79 (1 = yes)          -0.0755  -0.0691 
       (0.1833)  (0.1488) 
Degree of disability 80 to 89 (1 = yes)          -0.4504**  -0.2185 
       (0.1494)  (0.1536) 
Degree of disability 90 to  100 (1 = yes)          -0.8827***  -0.4018*** 
       (0.2015)  (0.1203) 
Age (years)  -0.0662***  -0.0653***  -0.0667*** -0.0665*** -0.0662*** -0.0663*** 
 (0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.0160)  (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Age  (squared)  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Years  of  schooling  0.0181 0.0169 0.0179 0.0175 0.0175 0.0172 
 (0.0187)  (0.0188)  (0.0186)  (0.0188) (0.0185) (0.0188) 
Work  experience  (years)  0.0135+ 0.0135+ 0.0126+ 0.0135+ 0.0123+ 0.0136+ 
 (0.0072)  (0.0072)  (0.0071)  (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
  20   21 
Unemployment  experience  (years)  0.0135 0.0132 0.0117 0.0129 0.0107 0.0133 
 (0.0153)  (0.0153)  (0.0152)  (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0153) 
Monthly household net income (€)  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
German nationality (1 = yes)  -0.0650  -0.0602 -0.0679 -0.0597 -0.0709 -0.0640 
 (0.1119)  (0.1118)  (0.1119)  (0.1118) (0.1115) (0.1113) 
Married (1 = yes)  0.0137  0.0163  0.0141  0.0168  0.0134  0.0162 
 (0.0606)  (0.0604)  (0.0606)  (0.0603) (0.0606) (0.0603) 
Out of the labor force (1 = yes)  -0.0588+  -0.0731* -0.0502 -0.0727* -0.0513 -0.0733* 
 (0.0327)  (0.0328)  (0.0326)  (0.0328) (0.0326) (0.0328) 
Retired (1 = yes)  -0.0323  -0.0353  -0.0309  -0.0356  -0.0276  -0.0354 
 (0.0591)  (0.0591)  (0.0589)  (0.0591) (0.0589) (0.0591) 
Unemployed (1 = yes)  -0.4947***  -0.4980*** -0.4944*** -0.4977*** -0.4954*** -0.4980*** 
 (0.0376)  (0.0375)  (0.0375)  (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0375) 
Other labor force status (1 = yes)  -0.0508  -0.0568+  -0.0478  -0.0565+  -0.0485  -0.0562+ 
 (0.0329)  (0.0328)  (0.0329)  (0.0328) (0.0329) (0.0328) 
Constant  9.1140*** 9.1298*** 9.1158*** 9.1432*** 9.1149*** 9.1423*** 
 (0.6505)  (0.6502)  (0.6497)  (0.6507) (0.6489) (0.6505) 
7 Household type dummies  (included)  (included)  (included) (included) (included) (included) 
Year  dummies  (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) (included) 
No. of observations  50,951  50,951 50,951 50,951 50,951 50,951 
No.  of  individuals  8,725 8,725 8,725 8,725 8,725 8,725 
Sig.(Model)  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Coefficients, standard errors that are adjusted for clustering on the person level in parentheses. ***/**/*/+ denote significance on the .1%, 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 
 